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RELIGIOUS LAW, FAMILY LAW AND ARBITRATION: 
SHARI’A AND HALAKHA IN AMERICA† 
MOHAMMAD H. FADEL*
INTRODUCTION
Western democracies in recent years have witnessed dramatic and of-
ten highly-charged debates regarding Islamic law, women, and the limits of 
pluralism in a liberal polity. Perhaps the most relevant of these debates was 
the Shari’a Arbitration controversy of Ontario, Canada in 2004–2005 (Sha-
ri’a Arbitration controversy). Although other religious groups in Ontario 
had long made use of private arbitration for the resolution of intra-
communal family disputes, a transatlantic controversy erupted when a 
group of Sunni Muslims announced their intent to establish a mechanism to 
allow Sunni Muslims to arbitrate their family law disputes in accordance 
with their understanding of Islamic law. This controversy was resolved 
only when Ontario took the drastic step of prohibiting the arbitration of all 
family law disputes in which the arbitrator purported to apply non-
Canadian law.1 Great Britain, too, experienced its own moment of Islamic 
law anxiety when the Archbishop of Canterbury suggested that British 
commitments to pluralism might require the English legal system to recog-
nize certain aspects of Islamic law.2 That controversy was subsequently 
† This article is from my Keynote Lecture at the “Shari’a and Halakha in America” Conference held at 
the Institute for the Humanities, University of Illinois at Chicago, from April 15-16, 2013. 
* Mohammad H. Fadel is the Canada Research Chair for the Law and Economics of Islamic Law and 
an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. 
 1.  Numerous academic articles have been published in response to the Shari’a Arbitration 
controversy. See, e.g., Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s 
Arbitration Act and Its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2004); Anver M. Emon, 
Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence, and Multicultural Accommodation, 87 
CANADIAN B. REV. 391 (2009); Jean-Francois Gaudreault-DesBiens, The Limits of Private Justice? The 
Problems of the State Recognition of Arbitral Awards in Family and Personal Status Disputes in Ontar-
io, 16 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 18 (2005); Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary 
Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573 (2008); Melissa S. 
Williams, The Politics of Fear and the Decline of Multiculturalism, in THE TIES THAT BIND:
ACCOMMODATING DIVERSITY IN CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 53 (John-Erik Fossum et al. 
eds., 2009). For a critical overview of the reaction to the controversy related to Islamic arbitration, see
Natasha Bakht, Were Muslim Barbarians Really Knocking on the Gates of Ontario?: The Religious 
Arbitration Controversy–Another Perspective, 2006 OTTAWA L. REV. (40th Anniversary Ed.) 67. 
 2.  See, e.g., John F. Burns, Top Anglicans Rally to Besieged Archbishop, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
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heightened when it was revealed that British Muslims had already set up 
judicial councils that engaged in legally binding arbitration of family law 
disputes pursuant to British law.3 
The debates surrounding whether to permit binding family law arbitra-
tion, particularly when such arbitrations are based on religious or otherwise 
non-liberal legal systems, raise many important and difficult questions 
from the perspective of liberal political theory. It forces a confrontation 
between various core values within the liberal tradition, particularly, gender 
equality and religious freedom, or even more generally, the conflict or po-
tential conflict between liberalism’s egalitarian commitments and its com-
mitments to personal and associational autonomy. 
This essay will attempt to answer the question, whether the results of 
religiously-based family law arbitration should receive legal recognition 
from the perspective of the principles of political liberalism. I will begin 
with a discussion of the role of the family within political society as set out 
by John Rawls in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Second, I will dis-
cuss why religious conceptions of the family will necessarily conflict in 
certain respects with the politically liberal conception of the family, using 
certain examples from some aspects of Muslim family law. Third, I will 
discuss Rawls’ conception of reflective equilibrium, and argue that arbitra-
tion is, from an institutional perspective, an effective tool or even a catalyst 
for generating a reflective equilibrium between public conceptions of jus-
tice and non-conforming conceptions of justice, including religious ones. I 
will illustrate this by discussing Islamic conceptions of distributive justice 
within the family and comparing them to the default norms that apply in 
North America. I will conclude with a discussion of whether arbitration, in 
fact, can act as an effective tool for protecting the autonomy of individual 
religious believers while vindicating the liberal commitments to the politi-
cal role of the family in a democracy. 
that erupted in Britain as a result of Archbishop Rowan Williams’ speech where he stated that recogniz-
ing certain elements of Islamic law would be consistent with British law); Rowan Williams, Archbishop 
of Canterbury, Archbishop’s Lecture–Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective, 
Address Before the Royal Courts of Justice (Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1137/archbishops-lecture-civil-and-
religious-law-in-england-a-religious-perspective. 
 3.  Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 14, 
2008, available at EBSCOhost 7EH4103866205. For more information on the operation of the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal in the United Kingdom, see MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL,
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I. EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM
During the Shari’a Arbitration controversy in Ontario, one of the cen-
tral objections to the legal recognition of Islamic family law arbitrations 
was that Islamic law would conflict with Canadian commitments to gender 
equality within the family.4 The meaning of equality within the family, 
however, remains deeply contested, even among liberals. And even reli-
gions that are commonly viewed as endorsing a patriarchal family structure 
have their own conceptions of gender equality. Islam, for example, teaches 
its followers about the equal moral worth of men and women, and the New 
Testament states that men and women are “all one in Christ Jesus.”5
Equality, therefore, can mean radically different things, especially in 
connection with its application to particular disputes. Numerous plausible 
(though incompatible) theories regarding the family exist, which are con-
sistent with some theory of liberal equality. For example, one could take 
the view that gender equality in marriage should be viewed as a matter of 
distributive justice. In that case, equality means that men and women 
should receive an equal share of the benefits of married life. One potential 
drawback of such a conception, however, is that it would not exclude mar-
riages organized around a gendered division of labor, if such a marriage 
resulted in an equal (or relatively equal) sharing of the burdens and benefits 
of marriage.6 Alternatively, equality within the family could produce a 
conception of marriage as “an egalitarian liberal community” that “resists 
individual accounting” of desert.7 But such a conception would preclude 
traditional homemakers from receiving any tangible rewards for non-
market services they perform in the household.8 Some feminists, however, 
argue that marriage should be treated in a manner analogous to a partner-
 4.  See, e.g., Anna C. Korteweg, The Sharia Debate in Ontario, 18 ISIM REV. 50, 50–51 (Au-
tumn 2006). 
 5.  Quran, l ‘Imr n 3:195 (“And so their Lord answered their prayers, saying ‘I suffer not the 
loss of the deeds of any of you, whether male or female; you are of one another.’”) (author’s translation 
from original Arabic); Al-Nis ’ 4:124 (“Whosoever does a righteous deed, whether male or female, and 
is a believer, they shall enter Paradise . . . .”) (author’s translation from original Arabic); Galatians 3:28 
(New International Version). 
 6.  Empirical evidence in fact suggests that traditional marriages are more likely to produce this 
result than most two-wage earner couples. Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is 
There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 519 (1998).  
 7.  Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 77–79 
(2004). 
 8.  Frantz and Dagan argue that any attempt to value the individual contributions of each member 
to the marital estate would inevitably undermine the communal ethic, which underwrites the marital 
venture. Id. at 89–90. While there must be limits on exploitation of the asymmetric contributions of one 
of the partners, the ideal of community according to them cannot be realized in the absence of a sense 
of vulnerability. Id. An ethic of desert that would guarantee the monetary value of all contributions to 
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ship, in which case equality would require valuing the individual contribu-
tions of each spouse to the family, including the non-monetary contribu-
tions historically provided by wives, namely child rearing and housework.9
If “care work” is monetized, though, it might encourage women to continue 
to specialize in household rather than market production.10 This would have 
the unintentional effect of reinforcing the gendered-division of labor that 
many feminists have traditionally sought to eliminate.11
Political liberalism does not attempt to determine which of these liber-
al (or non-liberal) conceptions of equality is correct. It instead regulates the 
family from the perspective of what is required “to reproduce political so-
ciety over time” in a manner consistent with its ideal of treating all citizens 
as “free and equal.”12 Because the family is part of political society’s basic 
structure, labor inside the family is “socially necessary labor.”13 On Rawls’ 
account, however, the family is an association14 and therefore “political 
principles of justice—including principles of distributive justice—[do not] 
apply directly to the internal life of the family.”15 They are relevant only in 
a negative sense, meaning that the basic rights of women as citizens place 
limits on permissible forms of family organization.16 The public constraints 
of justice on matters of internal associational life must not be so severe, 
however, as to constrain “a free and flourishing internal life [of the associa-
tion].”17
Rawls’ analysis of the family effectively places it in a median position 
between public institutions (to which the principles of justice apply direct-
ly) and associations (to which the principles of justice require only a right 
of exit). On the one hand, the family, because of its essential role in the 
reproduction of political society over time, is part of the basic structure of 
society. On the other hand, it is a voluntary association and therefore the 
principles of justice do not apply to it in the same way that the principles of 
justice constrain a wholly public institution, such as the legislature or 
 9.  Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers, Myths, and the Law of Divorce: One More Feminist Case for 
Partnership, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 232–233 (2006). 
 10.  Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 421–22, 425 (2007). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 779–80 (1997). 
 13.  Id. at 788. 
 14.  See generally, JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 40–43 (2005) (describing “association” 
as a kind of voluntary ordering within political society that, because of its voluntary nature, is entitled, 
among other things, to offer different terms to different persons in the association). 
 15.  Rawls, supra note 12, at 790. 
 16.  Id. at 789–90. 
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courts. Rawls’ analysis of the family within political liberalism has im-
portant implications for equality within a system of family law that is polit-
ically liberal: it tolerates the continued existence of inequality within the 
family, but on the condition that such inequality “is fully voluntary.”18 Re-
ligiously justified hierarchies of the family, therefore, are consistent with 
the principles of justice if the background conditions of political justice are 
met. 
According to Rawls, the only gender-based inequality that must be 
abolished as a matter of the principles of justice is that which is involun-
tary.19 Religiously justified inequality satisfies the voluntariness require-
ment because adherence to religion in a politically liberal regime is, by 
definition, voluntary. While Rawls appears indifferent as to whether the 
burdens of labor in the family should be shared equally between men and 
women, or whether it is enough for women to be fairly compensated for 
taking on a disproportionate share of such labor, he insists that justice re-
quires that one of these two possibilities be satisfied.20
Therefore, for Rawls, family law plays a secondary role in guarantee-
ing gender equality, because women enjoy all the basic rights of citizens 
and also have access to the material means necessary to allow them to 
make effective use of their liberties and opportunities.21 In such circum-
stances, any residual gender-based inequality can be assumed to be volun-
tary. From a “Rawlsian” perspective, therefore, what is crucial is that 
women are fairly compensated for any additional work they take on with 
respect to reproductive labor (measured against a hypothetical baseline of 
reproductive labor that reflects a gender-neutral division of labor). If this is 
the case, and the background political conditions are otherwise just, politi-
cal liberalism has nothing to say about the internal organization of the 
family, even one that explicitly endorses a gendered division of labor.22
 18.  Id. at 792 (“[A] liberal conception of justice may have to allow for some traditional gendered 
division of labor within families—provided it is fully voluntary and does not result from or lead to 
injustice.”). Rawls further explains that an action is only “voluntary” if it is rational from the perspec-
tive of the actor and “all the surrounding conditions are also fair.” Id. at 792 n.68. 
 19.  Id. at 792. 
 20.  Id. at 792–93. 
 21.  RAWLS, supra note 14, at 469–71. 
 22.  One might object to this conception of the family because it does not sufficiently take into 
account the effect upon children of growing up in a family organized around principles of gender 
hierarchy. Presumably, Rawls’ reply would be that children are also exposed to the principles of justice 
through mandatory public education, and therefore a family organized around principles of gender 
hierarchy would not be free to insulate their children from the egalitarian norms of public reason. See
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II. CONFLICTING VALUES BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND POLITICALLY 
LIBERAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE FAMILY
Political liberalism regulates the family with the purpose of insuring 
that it nurtures the next generation of citizens in a fashion that is consistent 
with basic constitutional values.23 Religious conceptions of the family, by 
contrast, are generally organized around much broader concerns, such as 
promoting that religion’s particular way of life, including its conception of 
the good, and in the case of salvation religions, preparing the ground for its 
members’ ultimate salvation. The much broader concerns of religious regu-
lation of marriage are reflected in the importance that traditional religions 
accorded marriage, which was often viewed as a relationship that included 
both secular and other-worldly concerns.24
In the case of Islam, marriage is viewed as so significant to one’s 
standing as an upright member of the community that it is often referred to 
as “half of religion.”25 Marriage is viewed as indispensable to an individu-
al’s spiritual well-being because, among other things, it allows for the licit 
expression of sexual desire. It is also generally productive of a thick web of 
family relations, not only because most marriages will produce children, 
but because it is expected that marriage will generate important ties of so-
cial (and moral) solidarity between the families of the spouses. 
At the same time, however, marriage represented a critical secular in-
stitution that was probably more important to the lives of its members than 
any other institution with which an individual interacted. Marriage in-
volved the formation of a household and generally triggered substantial 
transfers of property. Marriage imposed a regime of economic rights and 
responsibilities among the members of the household (and sometimes oth-
ers in an extended family relationship); established rules for the inter-
generational transfer of wealth; rules for affiliating children to parents and 
assigning financial and nurturing responsibility over them; and rules for the 
 23.  Rawls, supra note 12, at 779. (“[T]he government would appear to have no interest in the 
particular form of family life, or of relations among the sexes, except insofar as that form or those 
relations in some way affect the orderly reproduction of society over time.”). 
 24.  The Roman Catholic Church, for example, regulated marriage through the institution of 
Canon Law, even though Canon Law in principle only applied to the internal operation of the Church, 
on the theory that marriage itself was a religious sacrament. See D. L. D’AVRAY, MEDIEVAL 
MARRIAGE: SYMBOLISM AND SYMBOLISM (2005), for a detailed discussion of the sacramental nature of 
marriage in Catholic religious doctrine and its impact on the development of family law in Latin Chris-
tendom. 
 25.  See, for example, 9 IBN AJAR AL- ASQAL N , FAT  AL-B R SHAR A  AL-BUKH R
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dissolution of households, along with a substantial body of rules governing 
ongoing economic relations among the former members of the household.26
In considering how Islamic conceptions of marriage interact with lib-
eral ones, therefore, it is always crucial to distinguish, to the extent possi-
ble, those Islamic commitments that are religious in nature from those that 
are more narrowly legal. Islam, as a legal system, regulates the formation 
of marriage contracts by stipulating who has the capacity to enter into such 
contracts, the conditions for the validity of such contracts, and the remedies 
for defective marriage contracts as well as breaches of the marriage con-
tract.27 Because of the existence of legal pluralism within Islamic law, nu-
merous potential answers exist to these questions, some of which may be 
more in conformity with liberal values of equality than others.28
As a general rule, Islamic law’s conception of family law was highly 
structured by gender, with men and women assigned different rights and 
obligations within the household—men were generally expected to special-
ize in economic production outside the household while women were ex-
pected to specialize in domestic and reproductive labor inside the house-
household.29 Islamic law also afforded men the prerogative to divorce their 
wives at will as well as the right to marry another woman while remaining 
married to their first wife, without recognizing a reciprocal right in the 
wife.30 Men also had a qualified right to discipline their wives, including 
the privilege to use force in limited circumstances.31 Inheritance rules pro-
vided that males of the same class would receive twice as much as a simi-
larly situated female, e.g., a widower would receive one-fourth of the estate 
of his deceased wife, while a widow would receive only one-eighth of the 
estate of her deceased husband. Sons also received twice the share of simi-
 26.  For a brief overview of Islamic family law and the various rights and obligations that are 
produced by virtue of marriage, see JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 161–74 
(1964) and WAEL HALLAQ, SHAR A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 271–95 (2009). 
 27.  HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 271–80. 
 28.  For a discussion of the differences between various schools of Islamic law as to marital rights 
and obligations, see Mohammad H. Fadel, Political Liberalism, Islamic Family Law and Family Law 
Pluralism, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE 
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 164, 175–78 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012) (stating 
that some legal positions are more compatible with liberal family law than others). 
 29.  For some of the gender-based rules that characterize Islamic family law, see HALLAQ, supra 
note 26, at 277 (husband’s dower obligation and right to marry up to four women simultaneously). See
also id. at 278–79 (difference of right to sexual enjoyment depending on gender); id. at 279 (husband’s 
obligation to maintain the wife out of his property and earnings); id. at 280 (husband’s prerogative to 
dissolve the marriage unilaterally); id. at 287–88 (rules governing child custody and husband’s obliga-
tion to maintain the wife).  
 30.  Id. at 163–65. 
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larly situated daughters.32 The rules governing custody and guardianship of 
minor children were similarly gendered. For example, upon the dissolution 
of a marriage, the mother would generally be awarded custody of the cou-
ple’s minor children, but upon the children reaching a specified age, which 
differed for sons and daughters, the father would become the custodial 
parent.33 In all cases, the father was entrusted with guardianship over the 
children from the time of their birth until they became legal adults.34
The gendered-structure of rights within the family could be remedied 
to a certain extent, however, with contractual stipulations of the parties to a 
marriage contract. A woman could obtain a condition within the marriage 
contract that prohibited her husband from exercising his right to marry a 
second wife without her approval; alternatively, a woman could require her 
husband to give her a right to divorce upon his taking a second wife, or 
give her the option in this circumstance either to divorce herself or the sec-
ond wife.35 She could also stipulate the right to divorce her husband at will, 
at least according to the anaf s.36 Likewise, the gendered rules of inher-
itance law could be circumvented through other means of intergenerational 
wealth transfers, such as inter vivos gifts, which were subject to a norm of 
equality without regard to gender, or trusts, which permitted the founder to 
specify with great freedom which persons—heirs, and non-heirs—would 
receive his property. 
Religious norms, however, emphasized the spiritual element of mar-
riage, such as the notion prevalent among some Muslims that marriage is a 
ritual that has otherworldly significance in addition to its secular func-
tions.37 This ritualistic view of marriage, in turn, encouraged an ethic of 
sacrifice and self-abnegation, particularly among females, in the name of 
preserving the family, and promised women special religious merit for 
patiently bearing with abusive husbands, for example. 
Religious ideals also influenced the way jurists interpreted provisions 
in marriage contracts. Instead of interpreting contractual provisions using 
an assumption of arm’s-length bargaining, which is appropriate for com-
mercial contracts (mush a), they interpreted stipulations in marriage 
 32.  HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 292. 
 33.  Id. at 287. 
 34.  Mohammad Fadel, Reinterpreting the Guardian’s Role in the Islamic Contract of Marriage: 
The Case of the Maliki School, 3 J. ISLAMIC L. 9 (1998) (discussing preconditions for a minor’s eman-
cipation from his or her father’s guardianship).
 35.  Fadel, supra note 28, at 164, 179–80. 
 36.  3 IBN BIDIN, RADD AL-MU T R AL  AL-DURR AL-MUKHT R 329 (D r al-Fikr 1992) 
(Leb.) (naka ah al  anna amrah  bi-yadih a  [If a man marries a woman on the condition that 
she can divorce herself, it is valid]). 
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contracts under an assumption that marriage contracts should be construed 
pursuant to a norm of mutual generosity (muk rama).38 At times, such an 
assumption could be favorable to women, like the rule adopted by one 
school of Islamic law that breaches of representations that were irrelevant 
to the wife’s ability to perform the marriage contract (e.g., physical virgini-
ty) were not legally actionable. At other times, such an assumption could 
be disadvantageous to women, as illustrated by the rule that a woman’s 
contributions to household expenses, though legally a loan to the husband, 
would be deemed gifts if the wife failed to enforce her claim against her 
husband in a timely fashion. 
Despite the gendered nature of Islamic law, I have argued elsewhere 
that there are good reasons to believe that many of these gendered rules do 
not represent categorical Islamic commitments, nor is it implausible to 
believe that Muslim citizens of liberal regimes would be more inclined to 
adopt interpretations of Islamic law that are more in line with values of 
gender egalitarianism. I have also argued that the very same extra-legal 
religious discourse that was used in the pre-modern period to justify an 
ethic of self-sacrifice can be expected to take a different, more egalitarian 
turn in the context of liberal regimes, where even religiously conservative 
Muslims tend to interpret the religious aspects of marriage in a more gen-
der-egalitarian fashion.39 The question here is whether the arbitration of 
family law disputes can be viewed as a normatively justified institutional 
solution to the conflict between liberal family law norms and religious 
family norms, and its potential to encourage the adoption of more liberal 
interpretations of Islamic family law and religious conceptions of the fami-
ly.
III. FAMILY LAW ARBITRATION AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM
As discussed above, political liberalism, in its “Rawlsian” conception, 
recognizes a certain degree of pluralism within the family. Pluralism is 
tolerated within the family because the role of the family, from the political 
perspective, is limited to contributing to the reproduction of political socie-
ty, literally and morally. Permissible forms of family life, therefore, may be 
restricted in light of those goals, but otherwise the equal freedom of indi-
vidual citizens means that they should be able to pursue their differing con-
ceptions of what constitutes a good family life as an inherent part of their 
right as citizens to pursue their rational conceptions of the good. This is 
 38.  Id. at 182. 
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particularly important for religious citizens, in light of the central role that 
family plays in religious conceptions of the good.40
The fact that religious communities are permitted to pursue their ra-
tional conceptions of the good within their families, however, does not 
necessarily support recognizing a right to arbitrate family disputes pursuant 
to the norms of that religious community. I do not argue that political liber-
alism mandates recognition of such a right. Still, recognition of a qualified 
right to arbitrate family law disputes in accordance with the internal norms 
of a religious community, whether properly religious or otherwise, is deep-
ly consistent with the ideals of political liberalism. In fact, it may be an 
ideal institution for effecting the kind of interaction between the public 
principles of justice and the internal norms of various religious communi-
ties that may reject some applications of those norms. 
One of the central values of political liberalism, indeed, perhaps its 
most crucial value, is the hope to generate terms of political justification to 
which all reasonable citizens can agree. Rawls derived his account of the 
principles of justice by using the heuristic of the “veil of ignorance,”41 but 
in order for such an arrangement to become practical in the real social 
world, it is necessary for a reflective equilibrium to exist in the minds of 
reasonable citizens that reconciles their personal convictions with the prin-
ciples of justice.42 As Rawls describes it, a reflective equilibrium results 
from a dialectical process between our considered convictions and the re-
sults of our theoretical inquiry resulting from the original position. It comes 
into existence when “our principles and judgments coincide,” but even after 
reflective equilibrium is reached, “[i]t is liable to be upset by further exam-
ination of the conditions which should be imposed on the contractual situa-
tion and by particular cases which may lead us to revise our judgments.”43
Just as Rawls envisions individuals engaging in a dialectic between 
their subjective ethical commitments and the results of their philosophical 
inquiry until the two reach a kind of equilibrium, it is possible to imagine a 
similar process taking place between the public institutions of justice and 
the internal norms of a religious community. Public arbitration provides an 
institutional forum in which a dialectical process helps to generate a “re-
 40.  See generally D’AVRAY, supra note 24.  
 41.  RAWLS, supra note 14, at 22–28 (describing the “original position” as decisions as to society’s 
basic structure, under the assumption that individuals are ignorant of their particular social circumstanc-
es). 
 42.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19–21 (1971) (describing the process by which actual 
convictions and theoretical convictions are brought into accordance through a process of mutual reflec-
tion).
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flective equilibrium,” or to use Rawls’s term in Political Liberalism, an 
“overlapping consensus.”44 Binding arbitration can perform this function of 
deepening an overlapping consensus with respect to a liberal society’s po-
litical commitments to both religious freedom and gender equality because 
it empowers private parties to adjudicate their disputes pursuant to their 
own rules, provided that the results of the arbitration do not contradict 
mandatory principles of justice. 
The process of binding family law arbitration, therefore, mirrors, in 
institutional terms, the relationship between the family and the principles of 
justice as envisioned by Rawls; pluralism, while presumptively permissible 
within the family, is subject to the limits demanded by the principles of 
justice. Accordingly, arbitration, far from insulating a religious communi-
ty’s practices from the principles of justice, acts to confirm that a commu-
nity is applying its norms in a manner consistent with the requirements of 
justice. Binding family law arbitration, particularly when performed by 
religious communities, also provides public institutions, as represented by 
courts, an opportunity to determine whether mistakes have been made in 
the formulation of the principles of justice. It thus provides a means for 
practical adjustments to mandatory legal rules by forcing the legal system 
to confront new circumstances and justifications that it had not perhaps 
considered when it formulated its rules. 
Arbitration, it should be clear, is limited to such issues as the parties 
themselves have the legal authority to resolve by consensual agreement. 
The right to submit family law disputes to binding arbitration is therefore 
an extension of the parties’ own contractual freedom. It is also limited by 
the contractual nature of arbitration; the parties to a dispute cannot arbi-
trate, for example, the rights of third parties, like children, or matters of 
criminal law or civil status, such as granting a divorce. What this means, in 
practice, is that binding family law arbitration is generally limited to finan-
cial matters between spouses, such as division of marital property and fu-
ture support obligations. 
IV. COMMON OBJECTIONS TO, AND CRITICISMS OF, RELIGIOUS
FAMILY LAW ARBITRATION
Many who are opposed to recognizing binding Islamic family law ar-
bitrations have pointed to the disparate rights given to men and women 
under Islamic family law to justify their position without considering 
whether those discriminatory rules would ever be relevant to a binding 
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family law arbitration in a liberal jurisdiction such as the United States or 
Canada. For example, Islamic law’s gendered approach to child custody 
and divorce could never be implicated in an Islamic family law arbitration 
in either the United States or Canada because the arbitrator lacks the power 
to grant or deny divorce or to resolve questions of child custody. Islamic 
law, however, does include its own rules regarding the distribution of mari-
tal assets and post-marital support obligations that are inconsistent with the 
prevailing approach to these questions in North America. First, there is no 
concept of marital property in Islamic law; both parties enter the marriage 
with their own property entitlements intact, with some qualifications that 
are of little importance in this context.45 Second, so long as the marriage 
remains intact, the husband is under a non-waivable obligation to maintain 
his wife.46 He is also under an absolute obligation to maintain his children 
until they reach the age of majority, in the case of minor boys, or until they 
marry, in the case of minor girls.47 Third, upon dissolution of the marriage, 
the husband’s obligation to maintain his wife for all practical purposes 
ends, although he is encouraged to give his former wife a departing gift.48
To what extent does political liberalism require some kind of equitable 
distribution of household assets as a condition to respecting the parties’ 
private resolution of their claims? Rawls suggests that political liberalism 
does impose such a duty. He states in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited
that because reproductive labor and household labor are both socially pro-
ductive, women must be compensated in one form or another for such la-
bor.49 Moreover, he suggests that the preferred mode for compensating 
women for their specialization in household and reproductive labor is to 
award them the equivalent of a partner’s interest in their husband’s earn-
ings during the marriage: 
But a now common proposal is that as a norm or guideline, the law 
should count a wife’s work in raising children (when she bears that bur-
den as is still common) as entitling her to an equal share in the income 
that her husband earns during their marriage. Should there be a divorce, 
 45.  SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 167. For a brief overview of the operation of Islamic property law 
in the context of the family, see Fadel, supra note 28, at 188–90. 
 46.  Fadel, supra note 28, at 188–89. 
 47.  SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 168. 
 48.  This follows from the fact that upon divorce, the former spouses stand in a relationship of 
strangers to one another, and the general Islamic rule regarding maintenance, i.e., that no stranger has a 
duty to maintain another stranger, applies.  
 49.  Rawls, supra note 12, at 788 (“reproductive labor is socially necessary labor”); id. at 792–93 
(“If a basic, if not the main, cause of women’s inequality is their greater share in the bearing, nurturing, 
and caring for children in the traditional division of labor within the family, steps need to be taken 
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she should have an equal share in the increased value of the family’s as-
sets during that time. 
 Any departure from this norm would require a special and clear jus-
tification. It seems intolerably unjust that a husband may depart the fami-
ly taking his earning power with him and leaving his wife and children 
far less advantaged than before. Forced to fend for themselves, their eco-
nomic position is often precarious. A society that permits this does not 
care about women, much less about their equality, or even about their 
children, who are its future.50
Yet, this is what Islamic law appears to do; upon dissolution of the 
marriage, the husband is entitled to depart with his earning power. It is far 
from clear, however, that Islamic law’s refusal to recognize an ongoing 
post-divorce maintenance obligation akin to traditional alimony, or an obli-
gation to allow the wife to share in the increased value of the family’s as-
sets during the term of the marriage, inevitably leads to the stark conclusion 
that Islamic law “does not care about women, much less about their equali-
ty, or even about their children.”51 Indeed, it would be extremely implausi-
ble to believe any society could long exist if it were truly indifferent to the 
fate of its women and children in the manner Rawls seems to suggest might 
be the case if the rule he suggests is not adopted. 
While it is certainly true that as a default matter, most jurisdictions in 
North America adopt a presumption of equal sharing of assets acquired 
during a marriage,52 parties are permitted to depart from this norm, whether 
by entering a valid pre-nuptial contract, or pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment concluded at the time of divorce. In both cases, so long as the terms 
of the agreements are untainted by unconscionability, courts will enforce 
them in accordance with their terms.53
The recent Canadian case, Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, confirmed 
the willingness of liberal jurisdictions to tolerate property divisions which 
vary widely from the default norm of equality.54 In this case, the appellant 
challenged the constitutionality of Quebec’s rules governing division of 
family assets insofar as their provisions applied only to de jure but not de 
facto spouses. The appellant and her partner lived together for many years 
and had three children when they separated. The appellant argued that she 
should be entitled to the same legal benefits a divorcing de jure spouse 
would receive, and that Quebec’s failure to extend such benefits to her 
 50.  Id. at 793.  
 51.  Id.
 52.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.09(1) (2002). 
 53.  Id. §§ 7.01–7.11 (2002) (setting out rules governing marital agreements). 
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amounted to a violation of the Canadian Charter’s guarantee of equal 
treatment as provided in Section 15. The Court, in large part, rejected her 
argument on the grounds that to impose the property regime attached to de
jure marriage to de facto relationships would amount to an unjustifiable 
interference in the autonomy of the parties.55
Moreover, not all scholars are convinced that an equal sharing of 
marital surplus is the appropriate rule rather than, for example, a norm 
based on unjust enrichment. Under an unjust enrichment model, one 
spouse, the husband for example, would compensate the wife for the value 
of the services she provided to the household during the term of the mar-
riage, as well as the opportunity costs she incurred for specializing in 
household production.56 From an ex ante perspective, it is not clear which 
rule would consistently further the equality of women who specialize in 
household and reproductive labor. For example, if the woman is fortunate 
enough to marry a successful professional, the sharing rule recommended 
by Rawls might make her better off than a rule based on unjust enrichment, 
unless the couple failed to amass significant household assets because they 
preferred to consume the husband’s income immediately. When marital 
assets are scarce, either because the husband did not generate significant 
income or because the couple dissipated his earnings, the wife would clear-
ly be better off with a remedy that simply compensated her for her contri-
butions to the household, without regard to the value of the household’s 
wealth.
The above example illustrates that, unless women are given an option 
to choose which of the two remedies makes them better off ex post, a pos-
sibility that itself seems unfair, Rawls was perhaps a bit optimistic when he 
suggested that a strong rule in favor of equal sharing should be mandatory. 
Perhaps the most straightforward answer to the problem of female speciali-
zation in household and reproductive labor would be the recognition that 
the public has a duty to compensate household and reproductive labor, at 
least insofar as we accept Rawls’ characterization of such labor as “socially 
necessary” labor. Reliance on the redistribution of private resources from 
the male partner to the female is too contingent on the availability of such 
 55.  Id. at 190. 
 56.  Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1277 (1998) (arguing that, ex ante, parties might very well rationally opt to treat the contributions 
of the party specializing in household production to the party acquiring market-valuable human capital 
as a debt to be repaid at an above-market interest rate rather than an equity investment on account of the 
risky nature of the investment); id. at 1315–16 (suggesting that alimony be structured as compensation 
for the opportunity cost of specializing in household labor and foregoing, perhaps permanently, oppor-
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resources to provide generally effective assurances that women will in fact 
be compensated for their contribution to the reproduction of political socie-
ty through their household labor. 
Viewed from this perspective, there is nothing necessarily sinister 
about Islamic law’s approach to the distribution of property upon the ter-
mination of a marriage. Instead of judging whether a particular distributive 
norm is, on its face, consistent with the equality of women, it might be 
more important to determine whether the woman is left in a precarious 
economic position solely because of the divorce. There are at least two 
reasons to think this may not be the case if arbitrators applied the Islamic 
law of property in cases of marital dissolution. First, because Islamic law 
recognizes the independent property rights of a wife and requires a husband 
to make a marital gift of property to the wife at the time of the marriage, it 
could very well be that her marital gift has substantial economic value. 
Second, because Islamic law does not require a wife to contribute to the 
household’s expenses, if the wife worked outside the home, she might al-
ready have a substantial sum of money in her own name that she saved 
from her own market labor. If, on the other hand, she used her earnings to 
offset household expenses, it is not unreasonable to believe that a Muslim 
arbitrator could deem such sums to be loans to her husband, which he must 
repay at the time of divorce. An arbitral award based on the combination of 
her marital gift and the economic value of her household contributions 
could very well prevent the result that rightly concerned Rawls: that di-
vorce should not leave a woman in an economically precarious position, at 
least in circumstances where she had been an active contributor to the wel-
fare of the household. 
Of course, it is possible that an arbitrator applying Islamic law could 
fail to take into account the wife’s non-monetary contributions to the 
household when he is determining how much household property should be 
allocated to the wife. This might be a particular risk for stereotypical 
households characterized by a professional husband who specializes in 
market labor and a non-professional wife who specializes in domestic and 
reproductive labor and thus lacks any skills that are valuable in the market. 
It may even be the case that some Muslim men would prefer to use Islamic 
law in an effort to minimize the amount they would have to pay to their 
former spouses. Such a motivation is not in itself wrongful from a political 
perspective, however, as evidenced by the fact that, generally speaking, 
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unenforceable.57 Accordingly, so long as the arbitrator’s award does not 
lead to an unconscionable result, it is hard to understand why there should 
be a principled objection to an arbitration based on principles of Islamic 
law that leads to an unequal, but not unconscionable, distribution of house-
hold property upon divorce. 
Others might argue that even if in particular cases application of Is-
lamic family would not produce results that are repugnant to public policy, 
a liberal state should still refuse recognition of such arbitration because to 
do so would be to endorse a mode of legal reasoning that, in its broad con-
tours, does not recognize gender equality as a fundamental principle. In 
other words, to recognize the results of Islamic family law arbitration 
would amount to an expressive injury insofar as it would uphold the results 
of a mode of reasoning that is broadly inconsistent with liberal modes of 
legal reasoning.  
This argument might be plausible if Islamic law could be construed as 
endorsing unequal distribution of household assets as a means of express-
ing a dogmatic view, for example, that marital breakdown is always the 
fault of women, and therefore, women must be punished when divorce 
occurs. In fact, however, the distribution of household assets in Islamic law 
is a result of gender-neutral principles of property law, which will vary in 
terms of gender impact in light of the particular circumstances of the 
spouses. In certain circumstances, for example, the stereotypical case 
(which drew the attention of Rawls in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited)
of the high-earning professional male and the woman who specializes in 
household and reproductive labor and thus is economically dependent upon 
her husband, the Islamic rules governing division of property upon marital 
dissolution clearly favors the male relative to the norm of equitable divi-
sion. In other circumstances, however, Islamic rules could very well favor 
the female if, for example, the wife works outside the home earning an 
income equal to, or nearly equal to, that of her husband. She could claim 
reimbursement against her former husband for any personal funds that she 
contributed to household expenses. In no circumstances could she be sad-
dled with her equitable share of the household’s debts incurred for house-
hold expenses or with an obligation to maintain her husband post-divorce.58
Islamic law’s rules governing the distribution of martial assets does not 
communicate an explicit or implicit message of female inferiority, and in 
 57.  See generally, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 52, § 7.05; Brian H. Bix, Premarital 
Agreements in the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 231, 235–39 
(2001).  
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many cases could result in a distribution of marital assets that is skewed in 
favor of the female relative to the norm of sharing espoused by Rawls and 
other liberals. Accordingly, it is hard to understand on what grounds one 
might argue that recognition of even substantively fair arbitrations con-
cluded under Islamic law should not be enforced on the grounds that they 
undermine fundamental commitments to gender equality. 
V. NEW YORK ARBITRATION LAW AND JEWISH FAMILY LAW AS 
PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF POLITICALLY LIBERAL RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAW
ARBITRATION
One might concede that, as a theoretical matter, liberal family law 
ought to permit binding arbitration of family law disputes in accordance 
with religious norms in the proper case, but nevertheless object on the 
grounds that, as a practical matter, religiously-grounded arbitration will 
effectively shield the discriminatory practices of religious communities 
from public scrutiny. This argument is based partially on the erroneous 
belief that there is no effective appeal from the results of arbitration. Ac-
cordingly, parties to family law arbitration might enter into an agreement 
that effectively insulates the results of the arbitration from meaningful judi-
cial review. This objection appears to confuse the power of courts to review 
the substantive decisions of an arbitrator with the power of a court to de-
termine, as a threshold matter, whether a particular legal claim is amenable 
to arbitration. While it is true that courts are highly deferential to the sub-
stantive decisions of arbitrators on the merits of the parties’ claims, they 
review de novo the threshold jurisdictional question of amenability to arbi-
tration.
Numerous decisions of New York courts involving disputes between 
Jewish couples, who submitted or agreed to submit some or all of their 
family law disputes to Jewish religious courts for resolution, illustrate this 
dynamic. The New York case law is clear that, as a threshold matter, a 
court is to determine whether the dispute is amenable to arbitration, for 
example, that the dispute does not involve some matter of mandatory pub-
lic law.59 Because matters such as division of marital assets and post-
divorce spousal support are not, as a general matter, subject to mandatory 
norms of public law, they are presumptively amenable to arbitration, pro-
vided the procedural requirements for a valid arbitration are met,60 and in 
 59.  Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
 60.  Golding v. Golding, 581 N.Y.S.2d 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (refusing to enforce an arbitra-
tor’s award where court found that wife was compelled to participate as a result of the husband’s threat 
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these cases, the arbitrator’s decision in these matters is binding.61 Decisions 
regarding child custody, however, are not amenable to arbitration, because 
that would violate mandatory public policy, which in New York requires a 
court to determine custody arrangements in the “best interests of the 
child.”62 New York courts also specifically enforce the obligation to arbi-
trate the dispute, even if the arbitration agreement provides for religious 
norms to govern the arbitration.63 More controversially, perhaps, New York 
courts refused to find that an agreement to arbitrate could be set aside on 
the grounds of duress despite the wife’s claim that her religious community 
would subject her to the threat of “shame, scorn, ridicule and public ostra-
cism” if she did not agree to participate in the arbitration.64 In short, the 
jurisprudence of New York courts with respect to family law arbitration 
seems to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to enforce the results of such 
proceedings, but only to the extent that the court would enforce the parties’ 
own private agreements. 
CONCLUSION
The New York courts’ approach of policing arbitral results on a case-
by-case basis for conformity with public policy, and only striking down 
those elements of an arbitrator’s order that actually violate public policy, is 
consistent with Rawls’ conception of a politically liberal family law. This 
approach understands that the function of public law in the context of the 
family is to ensure that the internal governance of the family does not de-
prive any of its members of their fundamental rights as citizens, and as long 
as that condition is satisfied, a family should enjoy autonomy. The ap-
proach of the New York courts contrasts with the approach taken by those 
who would categorically refuse the recognition of the family law arbitra-
tions applying religious law, in general, or Islamic law, in particular. The 
success of New York courts in policing family law arbitrations in the Or-
(declining to confirm arbitrator’s order where there was no evidence that procedural requirements of 
arbitration statute were satisfied). 
 61.  See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hirsch, 333 N.E.2d 312, 315–17 (N.Y. 1975) (upholding agreement to 
arbitrate spousal support claims); Hampton v. Hampton, 689 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); 
Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). 
 62.  Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 742–43. New York courts, moreover, follow a principle of sever-
ance in the event that an arbitrator’s decision included both permissible objects of arbitration and non-
permissible objects of arbitration. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 493–96 (upholding decision of rabbini-
cal tribunal granting a religious divorce, dividing marital assets, and awarding child support, but vacat-
ing order for joint parental custody). 
 63.  Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding order compelling hus-
band to appear before a rabbinic tribunal pursuant to agreement contained in his Ketubah, a Jewish 
religious marriage contract). 
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thodox Jewish community suggests that courts could easily do the same for 
arbitrations conducted pursuant to Islamic law. And as has occurred in the 
case of Jewish arbitrations, if the Muslim arbitrator rules in a manner that 
violates mandatory rules of public law, for example, by affirming a proper-
ty division that is unconscionable, or rules on an issue outside the scope of 
his jurisdiction, like determining child custody, New York courts are per-
fectly capable of refusing recognition of those awards while affirming only 
those arbitral awards that are consistent with law. 
Equally important, however, is that by enforcing Islamic family law 
arbitrations in cases where such arbitrations do not conflict with mandatory 
provisions of public law, arbitration could plausibly act as a catalyst in 
accelerating internal doctrinal reforms within Muslim communities on cru-
cial questions, such as what constitutes a fair division of property between 
spouses upon dissolution of the household. If so, arbitration would 
strengthen the desired overlapping consensus by bringing within its reach 
communities that might otherwise believe that public norms are contrary to 
their own principles, and therefore resist them. At the same time, recogni-
tion of Islamic law as a legitimate tool for family law arbitration would 
require secular judges to gain greater familiarity with Islamic law as a legal 
system, a step that would help normalize Islamic law and remove the stig-
mas associated with it. To the extent that this is true, recognition of Islamic 
family law arbitration also helps strengthen the overlapping consensus 
around robust notions of religious freedom and religious pluralism. Far 
from undermining social unity, then, family law arbitration, even if con-
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